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We extend prior work on proactiveness in family firms by examining the relationship between 
firm age and proactiveness. Specifically, we propose an S-shaped effect of aging of family firms 
on proactiveness. Additionally, we provide a contingency perspective by considering the 
moderating role of the dispersion of managerial control among family members. Using a sample 
of 199 Swiss family firms with dual respondents per firm, we find that proactiveness first 
declines, than increases, and finally decreases again as the family firm ages, and that this 
relationship is steeper when the managerial control is dispersed among multiple family members.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Proactiveness, the firms’ efforts to seize new opportunities, anticipating future market 
demands and actively shaping the external environment (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001), is an 
important trait of family firms’ entrepreneurial behavior (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 
2007; Nordqvist and Melin, 2010) and a key source of sustained growth and performance for 
many family firms (e.g., Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010). But to what extent are family firms 
proactive? Empirical evidence suggests that family involvement may play a bivalent role in 
determining the degree of proactiveness embraced by a firm (e.g., Casillas et al., 2010; Short, 
Payne, Brigham, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 2009) so that family firms cannot be consistently 
considered strong proactive organizations. More recently, scholars have suggested that the 
answer to the above question may vary along the firm’s life cycle (Hoy and Sharma, 2010; 
Sharma and Salvato, 2011; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012). For instance, Sharma and Salvato 
(2011) argue that “family firms vary with regards to success achieved in terms of opportunity 
creation and exploitation over time” (p. 1199). More specifically, in a qualitative study of long-
lived family firms, Zellweger and Sieger (2012) note that proactiveness in family firms is barely 
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stationary, and that the proactive attitude of family firms may change over time, with “periods of 
rather low levels of proactiveness, interrupted by phases of carefully selected proactive moves” 
(p. 78). Inspired by these works, we take the next step in developing an understanding of the 
temporal evolution of proactiveness in family firms and explore the nonlinear relationship 
between firm age and proactiveness. Specifically, drawing on the work of Corbetta and Salvato 
(2004), that addresses the coexistence of agency and stewardship behaviors in family firms, we 
predict a horizontal S-shaped effect of aging of family firms on proactiveness. That is, 
proactiveness first declines, than increases, and finally decreases again as the family firm ages.  
Moreover, in order to advance our understanding of the relationship between firm age 
and proactiveness in family firms, we provide a contingency perspective that shows how the 
dispersion of managerial control among family members moderates this relationship. The 
decision-making process changes depending on whether managerial control is focused or 
dispersed among family members, and this can alter how proactive attitudes and behaviors 
change over time.  
This study makes a number of contributions to family business research and to 
managerial practice in family firms. We advance the understanding of firm age as an important 
predictor of entrepreneurial behavior in family firms by showing when proactiveness is stronger 
and when it is weaker along the firm life cycle. Also, we bring new evidence about 
organizational age as an additional dimension of heterogeneity among family firms (Chrisman, 
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012), and identify the dispersion of managerial control as an 
important contingency to these differences. Theoretically, recognizing the sources and contextual 
factors of family firms’ entrepreneurial behavior is important to avoid conceptual inadequacies 
and empirical indeterminacies (Chrisman et al., 2012). Overall, our work outlines the critical 
4 
 
challenges for family firms to prosper and nurture their proactive posture as they age, and 
provides some important insights for family firm owners and managers, consultants, and policy 
makers interested in fostering entrepreneurship in family firms. 
The structure of the article is as follows. We first define proactiveness and review prior 
research on proactiveness in family firms. Drawing on this literature, we introduce the temporal 
dimension into this debate and present our hypotheses. It follows the description of the methods 
adopted and the presentation of the empirical results. Finally, we discuss our findings, limitations 
and contribution to family business theory and practice.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Scholars since Schumpeter (1954) have emphasized the importance of initiative in the 
entrepreneurial process. Penrose (1959) argued that entrepreneurs are important to the growth of 
firms because they provide the vision and imagination needed to engage in opportunistic 
expansion. Proactiveness is a forward-looking perspective characterized by the pursuing and 
anticipation of future wants and needs in the marketplace (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Thus, 
proactive firms capitalize on emerging opportunities and beat competitors by shaping the 
environment. Indeed, prior research on firm proactiveness has centered on the organizational 
pursuit of favorable business opportunities (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001) such that, as suggested by 
Venkatraman, proactive firms aim at anticipating and acting on future needs by “seeking new 
opportunities which may or may not be related to the present line of operations, introduction of 
new products and brands ahead of competition, strategically eliminating operations which are in 
the mature or declining stages of life cycle” (1989, p. 949). 
Proactiveness is also regarded as a distinctive aspect of family firms’ entrepreneurial 
behavior (Short et al., 2009) and one of the most important dimensions of entrepreneurial 
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orientation in the context of family firms (Nordqvist, Habbershon, & Melin, 2008). Conceptual 
and empirical work suggests that family involvement may play a bivalent role in determining the 
degree of proactiveness embraced by a firm (e.g., Casillas et al., 2010; Nordqvist et al., 2008; 
Short et al., 2009). In particular, persisting divisions in the literature stem from a fundamental 
schism among scholars regarding the prevalence of stewardship or agency behaviors in family 
firms.  
On the one hand, stewardship proponents argue that family and business goals converge, 
that family relationships tend to embrace affective trust, unselfish altruism, and that contracts 
take a relational nature. Family owners and managers are thus seen as committed to the well-
being of their companies, and emotionally tied to the long-run survival and reputation of their 
firms because they identify with their organizations, and their fortunes, careers, and recognition, 
as well as those of their children and ancestors, are strongly linked to their firms (e.g., Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2009). From this perspective, stewardship behaviors are likely to be prevalent 
among family owners and managers who will eventually see the proactive exploration of 
opportunities as an important means for achieving both corporate and family growth (James, 
1999). In such cases, generous investment in the future of the business, substantial funding of 
that investment and an inclination to sacrifice short-term gains for long-run and risky payoffs are 
more likely to be observed (James, 1999). Thus, scholars adopting a stewardship perspective 
predict a superior commitment of family firms to proactive search and pursuance of new 
business opportunities (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Nordqvist et al., 2008).  
Conversely, scholars adopting the agency lens assume that family goals diverge from 
business goals, and that calculative agreements among family members are prevalent. According 
to this view, the universal altruistic tendencies among family members are limited to narrower 
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family groups, while economic contracting prevails over relational contracting. Thus, family 
owners and managers are seen as driven by self-interest, and motivated to seek wealth and 
personal benefits for themselves and their narrow family group, even if this means missing 
promising entrepreneurial opportunities. In other words, this perspective suggests that agency 
behaviors prevail in the family firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004), such that family owners and 
managers are more prone to protect their personal wealth rather than to ensure a future to the 
firm, and likely use their voting control to appropriate company assets to fulfill their personal 
needs. Their goal to obtain resources in the form of perquisites, inflated compensation, and safe 
managerial positions leads to risk aversion, entrenchment and asymmetrical altruism (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). If family owners are risk averse and tend to use substantial resources 
for parochial purposes, they will not be inclined to invest adequately in the exploration and 
anticipation of new opportunities for the firm. As a consequence, agency proponents see family 
firms as conservative (Morck & Yeung, 2003), and willing to adopt defender strategies that 
emphasize efficiency over proactive opportunity recognition and exploitation (Short et al., 2009). 
It emerges from this literature that the level of proactiveness in a family firm will be 
strictly related to the prevalence of stewardship or agency behaviors among family members, 
which, in turn, depends on the nature of family dynamics. Corbetta and Salvato (2004), for 
example, noted that family firms may be more or less prone to embrace proactive entrepreneurial 
behaviors depending on the nature of family goals, trust, altruism, and interpersonal contracts 
among family members. As the nature of family dynamics naturally evolves over time (Gersick, 
Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), it is also likely that some 
heterogeneity in family firms’ proactive behavior will be observed across time. In this regard, 
many scholars have assumed that family firms are very proactive in their early stages (Discua 
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Cruz, Howorth, & Hamilton, 2013), and that proactiveness then consistently decreases as the 
family firm ages owing to routinization and path dependencies (Short et al., 2009). Other 
scholars challenged this view, providing preliminary empirical evidence that very high levels of 
proactiveness can be found also in older family firms (e.g., Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012). This is in 
accordance with the idea that the dynamics inherent in the evolution of the family may produce 
important variations in a family firm’s entrepreneurial behavior that go beyond, and add to those 
of the business (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Zellweger and Sieger (2012), for example, have 
noted that proactiveness in family firms may follow idiosyncratic trends over time, alternating 
phases of relatively low levels of proactive behaviors with periods of vibrant proactive moves. 
What is missing in this debate, however, is a conceptual lens through which to explain why 
family involvement may lead to such contradictory behaviors. Drawing on prior literature, we 
focus in the next section on the role of family dynamics in determining the prevalence of agency 
or stewardship behaviors in family firms across time, thereby building hypotheses that link firm 
age to proactiveness in family firms.  
Firm Age and Proactiveness in Family Firms 
The arguments reported in the previous section identify the potentially positive and 
negative effects of family involvement on firm proactiveness by outlining the contrasting views 
of stewardship and agency theories regarding the prevalence of self-serving or self-actualizing 
behaviors among family members in family firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). As noted, the 
prevalence of stewardship or agency behaviors among family owners and managers depends on 
the nature of family dynamics, and holds meaningful consequences for the level of proactiveness 
embraced by a family firm. As a family firm ages, our attention turns now to examining how 
variations in family dynamics along the family firm life cycle engender alternate phases of 
8 
 
increasing and decreasing levels of proactiveness. Our proposed model is presented in Figure 1. 
It provides an integrative synoptic view of the predicted pattern of proactiveness as a function of 
firm age in the unique context of family firms. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
As predicted by a rich body of literature on strategic and organizational change, the 
dotted line in Figure 1 represents the trend in proactiveness as an organization ages. 
Traditionally, young organizations are considered to be structurally unstable and to have high 
rates of learning. Early in life, decision makers have indeed little experience about the company 
and the environment and must experiment and actively seek out information to learn about and 
connect with their environment, identify a strategic focus, establish internal roles, and develop 
control mechanisms (e.g., Simon & Houghton, 2003). For these reasons, younger firms are 
expected to be proactive and well predisposed towards change (Baker & Cullen, 1993). 
Conversely, when firms age they typically strengthen their internal and external relationships and 
their behaviors become increasingly guided by institutionalized norms and habits (Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). In particular, firms develop well-embedded, robust routines derived from prior 
operating experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and pre-existing rules are increasingly used to 
understand their environment (Daft & Weick, 1984). Thus, ceteris paribus, older firms should be 
more inert than younger firms, suggesting a consistent decline in proactiveness as firms age 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Owing to family dynamics, that add to the natural evolution of businesses, this general 
pattern may be more complex in family firms. Specifically, the interplay between evolutions in 
family dynamics and the business is expected to result in the smooth boldface curve of Figure 1, 
indicating a fluctuating pattern of family firms’ proactiveness over time. This curve identifies 
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four distinct phases in the relationship between family firm age and proactiveness, that recall 
previous life cycle models of the family firm (Gersick et al., 1997). Initially, during the 
foundation phase, family and business largely overlap, as the family firm is likely to involve the 
founder and all those family members who share the entrepreneurial ambition of the family. 
Family involvement thus centers around strong bonding structural, cognitive, and relational 
social capital that can be leveraged among selected family members who share a strong 
commitment to stewardship over the family’s assets (Discua Cruz et al., 2013; Gersick et al., 
1997). As such, the family founder and the narrow group of her/his family members share a 
common destiny with their firm, and the goals of individual family members, as well as those of 
the family as a whole, are perfectly aligned with business goals. It follows that family members 
are most likely to promote the economic well-being and development of the firm rather than 
being concerned about particularistic interests; for example, the pursuit of perquisites and other 
private benefits that may subtract resources and energies necessary for proactive entrepreneurial 
engagement. Owing to goal alignment, relationships among family members involved in the firm 
are likely to rely on affective trust that facilitates informal agreement and faith in the intentions 
of one another, favoring the emergence of altruism among family members, and producing 
positive emotions and sentiments that reinforce relational contracts within the family. It follows 
that, in the founding stage of the family firm life cycle, family stewards will gain utility from 
succeeding in the business, and a “self-actualizing” model of men is most likely to be observed 
among family members (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). As a result, stewardship behavior will 
prevail in the foundation phase of the family firm’s life, and this is expected to turn into high 
levels of proactiveness. 
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With aging, both the business and the family evolve (Gersick et al., 1997). As the 
business grows, family members are more and more able to obtain both personal and economic 
returns from being involved in it. Also, success in the foundation phase produces positive 
emotions among family members, including pride, belonging, and prestige, that concur in 
reinforcing social bonds within the family (e.g., Arregle et al., 2007). Thus, the achievement of 
business goals helps the functional integrity of the family and the satisfaction of family members 
with their life. However, these flows are not easily sustainable as the family firm further ages, 
because the business grows arithmetically, while the demands of the procreating families grow 
geometrically (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). As the number of nuclear families 
who rely on the business as a primary source of income raises, the family gets increasingly 
fragmented. With reference to the taxonomy proposed by Gersick et al. (1997), the family firm 
enters the sibling partnership stage. Under these conditions, individual family members’ goals 
get more and more diverse (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), and diverge from those of the family as 
a whole. Indeed, goal alignment among family members is rare, and it can at best be transitory 
(Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). Each family member must first satisfy the needs of her/his own 
nuclear family, and more formal agreements among family members are thus needed. Trust 
among family members becomes more calculative, family members get divided into factions, 
and the utility function of each family member only partially corresponds to that of the business 
and other family members. As such, also the goals of the family and those of the business tend to 
diverge, leading to selective forms of familial altruism limited to narrow sub-groups of family 
members. Thus, as the family firm ages, the dynamics within the family system delineate a 
gradual transformation of family members from stewards to agents that pursue parochial interests 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). In this circumstance the proactive improvement of the business 
11 
 
through the search and exploitation of new opportunities will give way to inward-oriented 
policies that favor conservation of the existing position and the exploitation of existing 
businesses by the means of defender strategies and emphasis on efficiency (Morck & Yeung, 
2003; Short et al., 2009). The result is phase 1, in which increasing firm age is associated with a 
decrease in firm proactiveness. 
As the beneficial influence of the family is gradually replaced by parochial attitudes and 
utilitarian behaviors that inhibit the firm’s proactiveness during phase 1, the family keeps 
growing, continuously rising more heterogeneous claims. At the same time, the declining level of 
proactiveness that is predicted in phase 1 is expected to limit the growth of the family firm. As 
the family continues to be involved in a business that is more and more stagnant, it is reasonable 
to expect that family goals escalate to the point where the family firm is no longer sufficient to 
satisfy the economic needs of all family members. At that point, the financial returns from the 
firm will only represent a marginal contribution to most family members’ income, while the 
family firms’ reputation and family harmony likely become more important sources of benefits 
for families. As such, the utility functions of individual family members are likely to realign 
around that of the family as a whole and to the goals of the business. Owing to this realignment 
of goals, a proactive business agenda is likely to be re-launched in order to improve the firm’s 
ability to generate both economic and non-economic wealth to satisfy the family needs. In other 
words, and consistent with the description of the cousin consortium stage of the family firm life 
cycle described by Gersick et al. (1997), at a point of the family firm’s aging process it is 
reasonable to expect that the goals of the family tend to reconverge with those of the business. In 
support of this view, evidential and anecdotal evidence suggests that family firms can navigate 
the declining stage of their life and solve the goal dualities toward the revival of the 
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entrepreneurial activity (Nordqvist et al., 2008; Huybrechts, Voordeckers, & Lybaert, 2012). 
Remarkable cases such as Alessi and Beretta indicate that family firms that survive to the initial 
turmoil in their entrepreneurial activity can give rise to a family dynasty, such that continued 
business growth becomes an imperative to sustain a needed level of economic and non-economic 
returns for the family (e.g., Zellweger & Sieger, 2012). In this situation, family goals and the 
economic goals of the firm tend to come together and reinforce one another, accompanied by the 
reemergence of affective trust, altruism, and relational contracting among family members 
within the family. It follows that stewardship behaviors will resurface within the family firms, 
which can be expected to ultimately raise again the firm’s proactiveness, marking phase 2. 
Finally, in the long run, as the firm ages more and more, the role of controlling families 
tends to become less salient to the business. The longer the family has owned the business, the 
more likely the organization will rely on external managers, with the family gradually becoming 
a passive owner (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). The case of Fiat is indicative of this 
pattern, with the Agnelli family being at the helm of the firm for about a century before handing 
over the leadership to professional managers and just focusing on the ownership position (Davis, 
Bertoldi, & Quaglia, 2012). As such, individual family members’ goals tend to be little 
represented in the business, regardless of whether they are aligned or in conflict, and the family 
favors business goals as a mean of maintaining its economic returns. As the intersection between 
family and business systems becomes weaker, corporate routines and structures become 
internally consistent and take increasing weight in decision making over time, like in non-family 
firms. Precedent gradually dictates the future, and firms becomes more and more inert (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). This results in slowly declining proactiveness with age, as represented in 
phase 3, such that it asymptotically tends to the declining line of the traditionally assumed age 
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effect, regardless of the effects of family dynamics. Accordingly, we hypothesize a horizontal S-
shaped relationship between firm age and proactiveness in family firms. Formally, 
Hypothesis 1. There is a cubic relationship (horizontal S pattern) between firm 
age and proactiveness in family firms, with the slope first negative, then 
positive, and then again negative over the phases of organizational aging. 
Although we expect that family dynamics will produce an alternating pattern in the 
family members’ propensity to engage their firms in proactive entrepreneurial initiatives, an 
important caveat to that baseline hypothesis relates to the allocation of managerial power among 
family members. Managerial control dispersion among family members is defined as the power 
held by and distributed among family members who occupy managerial posts in the family firm 
and are able to directly influence decision-making (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Gersick et 
al., 1997). According to several authors, the dispersion of managerial control among family 
members exerts some meaningful influences on the effects of family relationships in family 
firms (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Thus, this factor represents an important contingency on 
the family members’ ability to influence business decisions, indicating how decision-making is 
“consensus sensitive” to multiple family members (e.g., Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 
2000).  
More specifically, as a firm ages the impact of family dynamics on proactiveness is 
expected to be more pronounced when multiple family members exert some managerial power. 
That is, in this situation many family managers actively participate to decision-making, thus 
influencing the firm’s strategic directions (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Firm decisions are 
thereby more likely to be sensitive to the individual family members’ claims, goal diversity is 
likely to get more pronounced, and the competition over firm resources among nuclear families 
is likely to get more difficult to manage (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). As such, the impact of 
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family dynamics on the entrepreneurial behavior of a family firm is expected to be stronger, and 
the pattern in family firms’ proactiveness outlined above is likely to be more accentuated (i.e., 
steeper). On the contrary, when one family member dominates the decision-making process, 
decisions get less participative (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007) and the family leader is less 
likely to be influenced by claims advanced by members of the extended family. Indeed, family 
firms with low managerial control dispersion tend to be governed by owner-managers who 
control their firm’s structure, resources and strategy without the input of other family members 
(Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Also, the family leader has the power to mediate among 
competing factions that may emerge within the extended family system, thus lowering the impact 
of family dynamics on the family firms’ entrepreneurial behavior over time.  
In sum, dispersion of the firm’s managerial control among family members is predicted 
to be associated with a more participative decision process in family firms, such that the 
fluctuating effects of family dynamics on proactiveness in family firms will be stronger when 
managerial control is dispersed among multiple family members than when it is concentrated in 
the hands of a single family member. Formally, 
Hypothesis 2: The cubic relationship between family firm age and proactiveness 
in family firms will be steeper when the managerial control is dispersed 
among multiple family members than when it is concentrated in the hands 
of one family member. 
METHOD 
Data for this study were collected with a survey of 199 Swiss family firms. To select 
firms for the survey, we identified all the companies registered with the Chamber of Commerce 
in Canton Ticino, Switzerland. This provided a sampling frame of 967 firms. Then, following 
Miller et al. (2008), we determined whether the firms were family owned (the majority of equity 
owned by a family) and had multiple family members involved in their operations. A total of 592 
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firms were family firms. We sent the survey to these firms, and we received 199 usable 
responses, a response rate of 33.61%.  The study’s sample is composed of family firms with an 
age ranging from 1 to 177 years (64.32% of firms are 1 to 50 years old; 24.62% of firms are 51 
to 100 years old; and 11.06% of firms are 101 to 177 years old). Additionally, all firms have less 
than 250 employees (small and medium-sized enterprises) except for 5 of them that are large 
enterprises. We compared the respondents’ size, age, and industry with those of non-respondents 
(whose data were provided by SwissFirms), and found no statistically significant differences. 
Moreover, no statistically significant differences were found between early and late respondents.  
The survey targeted the firms’ two highest executives (the CEO and the next-highest 
senior position). We addressed inter-respondent reliability by correlating the responses per firm. 
The result indicates significant inter-respondent reliability (Interclass Correlation Coefficient = 
.759; p < 0.001). Next, we addressed the issue of common methods bias in several ways. First, 
we used the first respondent’s data regarding proactiveness for our analysis. Also, we ran the 
regression analysis by using the second respondent’s data on proactiveness and results did not 
differ substantially from our reported analyses. Second, we used an objective secondary data for 
our dependent variable (age).  
We developed the survey in a series of steps. The questionnaire was first developed in 
English, then translated into Italian through a translation and back-translation procedure by two 
university academics fluent in both languages. Following this step, the questionnaire was pilot-
tested on six senior executives belonging to three family firms (two from each firm), and on five 
academics whose expertise focuses on research methodology and family firms. Their comments 
on the content of the survey instrument, item wording, terminology, and clarity were 
incorporated into a revised instrument. Next, the refined instrument was piloted again on a larger 
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sample of 53 family firms (which are not part of our final sample), and final revisions were 
made. These revision efforts created an instrument that provides a Cronbach’s  ranging from 
0.71 to 0.85.  
Variables 
We relied on the widely used scale developed by Miller (1983) to measure proactiveness 
(“our company has shown a strong commitment to research and development, technological 
leadership, and innovation”; “our company has followed strategies that allow it to exploit 
opportunities in its external environment”; 5-point scale) (= 0.71). This choice increases the 
comparability of our findings, given that the majority of empirical research has employed this 
approach (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). To measure age we considered the number of years the 
firm had been in existence. To measure family control dispersion we used a dummy variable 
indicating if the management was concentrated in the hands of one or multiple family members 
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). 
We also controlled for size, generational involvement, generational ownership dispersion, 
knowledge diversity, percentage of non-family members on the TMT, R&D investments, 
environmental dynamism, industry and performance, which are expected to affect a firm’s 
proactiveness1. First, because access to external resources is easier for larger firms, and this 
access can affect proactiveness, we controlled for size by measuring the number of full-time 
employees. This value was logged to address issues with its raw distribution. Second, given that 
                                                          
1 Additionally, given our interest in the passage of time in terms of firm age – and not merely in terms of the 
generation in control, which is also a factor that may affect firm proactiveness – as robustness check we run our 
analysis by also controlling for generation in control. This variable was not statistically significant and its inclusion 
did not change the other results. As an additional check, we again ran the analysis excluding firm age, while keeping 
generation in control. Again, generation in control was not statistically significant. We also included the squared and 
cubic terms of generation in control and still results were non-significant. This corroborates our argument regarding 
the central role played by the passage of time in terms of age on proactiveness in family firms. However, given that 
our findings showed that generation in control did not have a significant linear or non-linear impact on family firm 
proactiveness, and because of its high correlation with firm age (0.841; p < 0.001), it was not included as a control 
variable in the statistical analyses we report. 
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generational involvement – the number of family generations simultaneously involved in the 
management of the firm has been proved to affect entrepreneurial activities (e.g., Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007), we controlled for this variable in our study. Third, we also controlled for 
generational ownership dispersion – the level of ownership that resides within one, two or more 
generations (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Indeed, the literature suggests it may affect the 
family firm’s proactiveness (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997). Fourth, given its potential impact on 
creativity and proactiveness, we controlled for knowledge diversity by adapting a five item scale 
from Tiwana and Mclean (2005): “members of this team vary widely in their areas of expertise,” 
“members of this team have a variety of different backgrounds and experiences,” “members of 
this team have skills and abilities that complement each other’s”, “members of this team have 
studied in different educational institutions” “members of this team have been educated in 
different specializations”, (5-point scale) (= 0.85). Fifth, we controlled for percentage of non-
family members on the TMT, given that it is recognized that non-family professional managers 
may bring more objectivity to the decision-making process (Schulze et al., 2003; Su & Dou, 
2013) and thereby encourage proactive strategies. Sixth, we also controlled for R&D investment, 
which may affect entrepreneurship and proactive behaviors (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990): “R&D 
spending is high,” and “R&D investments are taken into high consideration in our company” (5-
point scale) ( = 0.79). Seventh, because firms that operate in dynamic environments are likely 
to be technology-intensive and thus need to systematically explore new proactive opportunities, 
we controlled for dynamism. This factor was measured with a three-item index taken from 
Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda (2005): “environmental changes in our local market are 
intense,” “customers regularly ask for complete new products and services,” and “in our market, 
changes are taking place continuously” (5-point scale) ( = 0.80). Eighth, because industries 
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may differentially encourage companies to develop new and proactive strategies, we controlled 
for industry type. The agriculture industry was used as the comparison industry, with dummy 
variables differentiating the following industries: electronics, trade, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation/communication, finance, services, and others. Finally, a firm’s performance is 
expected to impact on proactiveness, so we also controlled for performance through four related 
financial items regarding net profit, sales growth, cash flow, and growth of net worth (5-point 
scale) ( = 0.85). Respondents were asked to compare the level of performance of their firm 
relative to their main competitors in the last 3 years (Naldi et al., 2007). 
RESULTS 
Regression analysis was utilized for hypothesis testing. The descriptive statistics and 
correlations of the study’s variables are presented in Table 1. Inspection of the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) showed that multicollinearity was not a concern. All VIF coefficients were lower 
than 10. Next, to check for normality, we employed the skewness/kurtosis tests (sktest 
command). Proactiveness appeared significantly nonnormal in skewness, kurtosis, and both 
statistics considered jointly. Based on the results of STATA’s ‘ladder’ command, a square 
transformation was needed for proactiveness to closely resemble a normal distribution (2(2) = 
1,51; P(2) = 0.469)2 (e.g., Hamilton, 2006). Also, to test for heteroscedasticity, we screened the 
data with the help of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and the White test (Cameron and 
Trivedi’s decomposition of the IM-test). The former tests whether the estimated variance of the 
residuals from a regression are dependent on the values of the independent variables; the latter 
establishes whether the residual variance of a variable in a regression model is constant. Both the 
                                                          
2 The results presented are those with the transformed proactiveness variable because they are methodologically 
superior. However, we ran the same models with the nontransformed proactiveness variable and found that these 
results did not differ substantially from those presented. This eases concerns about interpretation. Moreover, this 
comparison acts as a robustness check of our conclusions. 
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Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (2(1)= 1.06; prob>2=0.3033) and the White test 
(2=169.15; p=0.3342) indicated that heteroscedasticity was not a concern (e.g., Hamilton, 
2006). The results of our hypothesis testing are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  
Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 
We entered the control variables in Model 1, age in Model 2, age squared in Model 3, age 
cubic in Model 4, and the interaction terms in Models 5, 6 and 7 (Table 1). Hypothesis 1 
suggests that the relationship between firm age and proactiveness is cubic (horizontal S-curve). 
Importantly, neither age in Model 2 nor age squared in Model 3 were significant. On the 
contrary, in Model 4 age cubic, together with age and age squared, are significant and in the 
expected direction, thus fully supporting Hypothesis 1. In further support of this hypothesis, 
Figure 2 illustrates a horizontal S-curve between firm age and proactiveness. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that a high level of dispersion of the firm’s managerial control among family members 
is associated with a more participative decision process, such that the fluctuating effects of 
family dynamics on proactiveness in the family firm will be stronger when managerial control is 
concentrated within the hands of a single family member. Model 7 confirms that family control 
dispersion moderates the non-linear relationship between firm age and proactiveness. To further 
interpret this result we split the sample based on the family control dispersion dummy variable 
(see Table 3; Models 8 and 9). This allowed us to separately test the cubic relationship in each 
subgroup – a) one group when the control of the firm’s management is dispersed among multiple 
family members (Model 8); and b) the other when the control of the firm’s management is 
concentrated in the hands of one family member (Model 9). We ran separate regression analyses 
with each subsample: the S-curve relationship persists in Model 8 and becomes steeper as 
predicted (see Figure 3). However, the cubic relationship is not confirmed in Model 9. Thus, 
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Hypothesis 2 is only partially confirmed. As a robustness check, we also tested the possibility of 
a linear or squared relationship between firm age and proactiveness in each sub-group. As 
expected, no significant results were found.  
Lastly, we used Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to test for potential sample selection 
bias induced by the survival of younger or older family firms. For instance, older firms might 
survive longer because they are the best performers, while younger firms may fail or exit sooner. 
The Heckman procedure allows us to calculate a control variable, commonly referred to as the 
inverse Mills ratio, from the results of a first-stage probit model predicting the survival of 
younger and older firms. We constructed a dummy variable based on the median split of firm 
age. Entering this ratio into the second-stage final regression model removes any bias in the 
regression coefficients by accounting for sample selection. Proper identification of the inverse 
Mills ratio, however, requires that a variable is correlated with the first-stage probit model’s 
outcome (i.e., survival of younger or older firms), but not with the second-stage model’s 
outcome (i.e., proactiveness) (e.g., Hamilton, 2006). Because the “top management team’s total 
years of full time paid work experience in the firm” variable demonstrates these relationships, it 
was entered in the first-stage probit model, but not in the second-stage performance model (e.g., 
Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2004). We found that the inverse Mills ratio is not significant (r = 
-.023; p-value = .774) and that results from other variables are unaffected (see Huyghebaert & 
Van de Gucht, 2004). 
As an additional check, we constructed the dummy variable of younger and older family 
firms’ survival with other combinations. First, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
an age ranging from 1 to 50 (dummy variable = 0) or from 51 to 177 (dummy variable = 1). 
Second, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has an age ranging from 1 to 75 (dummy 
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variable = 0) or from 76 to 177 (dummy variable = 1). Third, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm has an age ranging from 1 to 100 (dummy variable = 0) or from 101 to 177 
(dummy variable = 1). Fourth, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has an age ranging 
from 1 to 125 (dummy variable = 0) or from 126 to 177 (dummy variable = 1). Finally, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm has an age ranging from 1 to 150 (dummy variable = 0) or 
from 151 to 177 (dummy variable = 1). In all these cases, still, the inverse Mills ratio was not 
significant and results from other variables of interest did not substantially change. 
DISCUSSION 
We examined the relationship between firm age and proactiveness in the context of 
family firms and found that firm age has a cubic relationship with proactiveness. Also, we found 
that family control dispersion moderates this non-linear relationship, such that it is steeper when 
managerial control is dispersed among multiple family members. We argue that this horizontal 
S-shaped relationship may help reconcile conflicting views on the proactiveness of family firms. 
Our results 1) suggest that family involvement is not individually exhaustive to understand 
family firm’s proactiveness, 2) support recent recommendations of family firm scholars to 
consider that family influence on the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation is not constant over time, 
and point to family dynamics as key drivers for explaining the causal relationship between 
family involvement and the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004), 
and 3) most importantly, offer prospective ideas on how family dynamics evolve over time and 
how this evolution adds complexity to the trend in proactiveness as a family firm ages, which 
thus appears as an area ripe for future research. Specifically, we develop a framework that 
emphasizes the role of family dynamics, and variations thereof, in determining the evolution of 
proactiveness in family firms.  
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The study makes a number of contributions to existing knowledge about entrepreneurship 
in family firms. First, by explicitly exploring how the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms 
changes over time our results indicate that the “family” introduces additional complexity in a 
phenomenon – the temporal evolution of a firm’s proactiveness – that has been previously 
assumed to be linear. In this regard, we add to the observation that downplaying the family 
variable in business and management research reduces the predictive accuracy and power of 
theoretical predictions (e.g., Litz, 1997). Second, the proposed framework contextualizes the 
opposing views on proactiveness in family firms. More specifically, this model emphasizes the 
role of the temporal evolution of the family system in terms of family goals, trust, altruism, and 
inter-personal contracts in determining the attitude of family owners and managers to embrace 
proactive entrepreneurial behaviors. Third, we advance knowledge about determinants of family 
firms’ heterogeneity in that our results outline family dynamics (and their variation as the firm 
ages) as sources of heterogeneity among family firms, and identify family control dispersion as 
an important contextual factor to understand proactiveness in family firms, contrasting the 
traditional view that firm age has consistent impacts on firm proactiveness. Thus, the findings of 
this study respond to recent calls for a more contextualized approach to understand the family 
firm’s entrepreneurial behavior (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2012). 
These considerations have important implications for advancing the theoretical 
understanding of the family enterprise, and they outline promising directions for future research. 
In particular, researchers have only recently started to focus their attention on intra-family goal 
diversity within family firms (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). One of the most important 
implications of our study is that goal diversity resulting from the interplay of family goals with 
the economic goals of the family seems to be evolving over time. Scholars have recognized that 
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these two classes of goals do not necessarily diverge (Zellweger & Nason, 2008) and are hence 
increasingly interested in identifying the conditions under which family goals cope or collide 
with the economic goals of the firm (Chrisman et al., 2012). Taking into account the temporal 
dimension can be thus very promising for understanding such dynamics. Accordingly, we 
encourage scholars to further explore how goals, values, and the unique cultural and sociological 
aspects of family firms evolve over time, a topic that has received very scant attention from both 
conceptual and empirical points of view.  
Our findings suggest that, on average, the temporal evolution of family dynamics causes 
a fluctuating trend in family firms’ proactiveness over time. As such, our results help reconcile 
conflicting views as to the entrepreneurial proactiveness in family firms (e.g., Naldi et al., 2007; 
Nordqvist et al., 2008; Short et al., 2009), and provide further insights regarding the irregular 
trend in proactiveness that family firms follow over time (Zellweger & Sieger, 2012). We have 
also shown that this irregular trend is more pronounced when managerial control is shared 
among multiple family members, suggesting that the willingness of family owners and managers 
to embrace entrepreneurial attitudes is contingent on their ability to influence decision-making 
and policy in their firms. Researchers who wish to continue with our line of inquiry could further 
assess the nature of this complex relationship by exploring how other configurations in family 
ownership, composition of the top management team, firm resources, and the characteristics of 
the external environment moderate the factors underlying the S-shape curve (Figure 1) and 
influence its slopes and inflection points.   
Like all studies, our work has some limitations, which provide further opportunities for 
future research. First, our study is focused on family firms that keep being family firms as the 
firm ages. It would be useful to extend our argumentations to the realm of family firms that exit 
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or cease to be family firms at a certain point in time. However, the closure or sale of a family 
firm is likely to be a very sensitive subject among members of family businesses who are 
typically protective of their privacy. An approach to solve the access problem would be to collect 
data from or through family business consultants. Besides providing useful contacts, consultants 
might possess important insights of their own that could be tapped for research purposes. 
Second, our sample is drawn from one country (Switzerland). We encourage scholars to 
add evidence about proactiveness in family firms in other countries to ensure the relationships 
found are not linked to Swiss institutional or cultural variables. For instance, proactiveness may 
be specifically bounded to cultural contingencies. Important differences across natural cultures, 
for example, social collectivism versus individualism and uncertainty avoidance, may inform 
institutional perspectives on how the effect of family dynamics on firm proactiveness in different 
phases of the firm age may vary in family firms from different regions worldwide.  
Third, we used firm age as a proxy for change in family dynamics over time. Thus, we 
can infer but cannot conclusively demonstrate the causal relationships between family dynamics, 
the prevalence of self-serving or self-actualizing behaviors among family owners and managers, 
and firm proactiveness. Future research is thus needed to further assess the mechanisms and 
processes through which family involvement affects proactiveness in family firms. In this regard, 
a more direct measurement of goals and dynamics inherent to the family system is warranted in 
future research, in that it would also enable researchers to explicitly explore the interplay of 
family and business goals over time, thereby outlining possible goal tradeoffs and/or goal 
activation logics that drive variations in the entrepreneurial behaviors and outcomes of family 
firms across time. For instance, qualitative studies could open up the black box of family 
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dynamics and investigate how unfolding events such as birth, divorces, and deaths within the 
family (Hoy and Sharma, 2010) may affect the firm entrepreneurial spirit and orientation.  
Finally, this study draws on cross-sectional data to examine the evolution of 
proactiveness in family firms as these organizations age, a topic that would ideally require 
longitudinal data and analysis techniques. Our results hold for firms that are owned and managed 
by a family at different points in time, but our arguments do not apply to those firms that close or 
cease to be family firms. For this reason, our results should be interpreted with caution, and 
future research is needed that takes alternative approaches, for example borrowed from business 
history (e.g., Colli, 2012), to offer more reliable and precise portraits of the evolution of 
entrepreneurial behaviors in family firms over time. 
The main practical implication of our study is that it suggests that certain phases of a 
family firm’s aging process are characterized by bigger challenges for proactiveness, owing to 
particularly struggling family dynamics. These phases are the one after the founding phase, 
typically referred to as the sibling partnership stage, and the latest phase of a family firm’s aging 
process.  However, our findings also suggests that the negative influences characterizing these 
particular phases of the organizational aging process can be managed and attenuated. This may 
be achieved for example by limiting the pool of family members who have decisional power in 
the firm, preferably identifying a single family leader who has the managerial discretion and 
legitimacy to create arrangements within the family. In so doing, the potential influence of the 
family group over the business will be reduced, and the deleterious effects of intra-family goal 
diversity will be neutralized or at least minimized, thus safeguarding the family firm’s ability to 




In this study we outlined a unique pattern of proactiveness that family firms follow over 
time, a pattern that is much more complex than that assumed in the traditional literature. As such, 
our findings emphasize the importance of considering the role of controlling families and the 
dynamics that characterize the family system in corporate entrepreneurship, identify the critical 
challenges for family firms to prosper and nurture their entrepreneurial posture as the 
organization ages, and provide some important insights for family firm managers, consultants, 
and policy makers interested in fostering entrepreneurship in family firms. These results point to 
the importance of incorporating the temporal dimension in family business research, as well as 
contextualizing it to the nature of family influences on the business, in order to develop a more 
complete and accurate understanding of family firms’ behaviors and outcomes. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations* 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Proactiveness 3.72 0.73 1.00 
        Age 46.27 39.38 -0.12 1.00 
       Family control dispersion 0.60 0.49 -0.05 0.15 1.00 
      Size 92.33 738.39 0.01 0.08 -0.06 1.00 
     Gen. involvement 1.54 0.55 -0.05 0.22 0.20 -0.04 1.00 
    Gen. Own. dispersion 1.50 0.79 -0.11 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.22 1.00 
   Knowledge diversity 3.88 0.61 0.35 -0.08 0.18 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
  % nonfamily memb. in TMT 0.24 0.30 0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.10 0.05 1.00 
 R&D investments 3.69 0.82 0.27 -0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.82 0.11 1.00 
Environmental Dynamism 3.27 0.72 0.25 -0.06 -0.07 -0.17 -0.07 -0.10 0.14 -0.11 0.12 
Electronics/informatics 0.04 0.20 0.03 -0.10 0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 -0.05 -0.11 
Trade 0.25 0.43 -0.16 0.18 -0.13 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 
Construction 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.24 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
Manufacturing 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.15 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.12 0.08 
Transp./communic 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.03 
Finance 0.02 0.12 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
Services 0.21 0.41 0.03 -0.23 -0.13 0.16 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.00 
Others 0.09 0.29 0.12 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.03 
Performance 3.92 0.56 0.33 -0.04 0.17 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.41 -0.11 0.30 
 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
 Environmental Dynamism 1.00 
          Electronics/informatics 0.10 1.00 
         Trade 0.08 -0.12 1.00 
        Construction 0.00 -0.08 -0.23 1.00 
       Manufacturing -0.11 -0.10 -0.28 -0.20 1.00 
      Transp./communic 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 1.00 
     Finance -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 1.00 
    Services 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -0.21 -0.26 -0.09 -0.06 1.00 
   Others 0.00 -0.06 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.16 1.00 
  Performance 0.08 -0.24 -0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.10 1.00 
 *In this table we report the values of firm proactiveness and size without the transformations performed in the statistical analyses and Figure 2 to resemble normal distributions. 





Table 2: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
Proactiveness Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Size 0.019 0.051 0.046 0.040 0.049 0.065 0.081 
Generational involvement 0.030 0.061 0.060 0.094 0.081 0.074 0.080 
Generational ownership dispersion -0.084 -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.052 -0.057 -0.058 
Knowledge diversity 0.274* 0.312** 0.316** 0.334** 0.366** 0.373** 0.325** 
% non-family members in TMT 0.124+ 0.116+ 0.117+ 0.123+ 0.110+ 0.110+ 0.105 
R&D investments -0.058 -0.082 -0.087 -0.105 -0.134 -0.122 -0.097 
Environmental Dynamism 0.210** 0.198** 0.195** 0.197** 0.185** 0.188** 0.188** 
Electronics/informatics 0.166+ 0.196* 0.195* 0.210* 0.208* 0.202* 0.205* 
Trade 0.050 0.023 0.020 0.017 -0.003 -0.013 -0.036 
Construction 0.120 0.110 0.104 0.093 0.084 0.071 0.063 
Manufacturing 0.143 0.141 0.133 0.151 0.132 0.104 0.082 
Transportation and communication 0.163+ 0.151+ 0.147 0.145 0.148+ 0.146 0.142 
Finance 0.049 0.025 0.023 0.037 0.028 0.035 0.022 
Services 0.132 0.088 0.086 0.092 0.076 0.078 0.059 
Others 0.172 0.156 0.153 0.168 0.156 0.153 0.142 
Performance 0.254*** 0.288*** 0.291*** 0.282*** 0.274*** 0.249** 0.276*** 
Family control dispersion (FCD)  -0.168* -0.170* -0.186** -0.288** -0.435** -0.176 
Age  -0.061 0.031 -0.837+ -0.785+ -1.277* -0.363 
Age squared   -0.094 2.092* 1.659 2.435* 0.132 
Age cubic    -1.406* -1.117+ -1.393* 0.023 
Age x FCD      0.180 0.799* -1.062 
Age squared x FCD      -0.558+ 3.414+ 

















Adjusted R2 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 
F statistic 4.59*** 4.56*** 4.31*** 4.41*** 4.25*** 4.25*** 4.37*** 
        




Table 3: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis with the two sub-samples of Family 
Control Dispersion (FCD) 
 
 








Size 0.034 0.031 




Knowledge diversity 0.397** 0.184 
% non-family members in 
TMT 
-0.009 0.301* 
R&D investments -0.134 0.029 
Environmental Dynamism 0.149+ 0.266* 
Electronics/informatics 0.270* - 
Trade 0.035 -0.062 
Construction 0.101 0.058 




Finance 0.015 0.080 
Services 0.028 0.100 
Others 0.184 0.143 
Performance 0.264** 0.292* 
Age -1.154+ -0.630 
Age squared 3.545* 1.014 







Adjusted R2 0.27 0.26 
F statistic 3.26*** 2.49** 























Figure 3: Horizontal S-curve between Firm Age and Proactiveness in Family Firms when 
the Firm’s Managerial Control is Dispersed among Multiple Family Members  
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